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Abstract
The choice of a particular technology when there is a set of them
available to ﬁrms has not appeared in the R&D literature yet. We
show some examples and present a model in which ﬁrms choose their
technologies from a continuum of available proﬁles and the resulting
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1spillovers depend on the compatibility among ﬁrms’ R&D technolo-
gies. Our results indicate that non-cooperating ﬁrms are interested in
using the same or very similar technologies. Therefore ﬁrms seek to
establish coordination mechanisms such as patent pools or Research
Joint Ventures. A RJV leads to higher levels of social welfare than
patent pools or the non-cooperative case.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is vast literature dealing with the phenomenon of Research Joint Ven-
tures (RJVs) from several points of view. One of these approaches is aimed
at explaining the emergence of RJVs as a way of internalizing spillovers1,
which can allow ﬁrms to free-ride their rivals’ R&D results. Since the sem-
inal paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990), several contribu-
tions have extended their model in diﬀerent ways2. Building on the work
1Other approaches have studied the problematic of the intangible assets and incomplete
contracts (see for instance Sandonis and Perez Castillo (1996)) or the international joint
ventures as transmissors of know-how (see Nakamura and Xie (1998), Maniagurria and
Singh (1997) or Nakamura et al. (1996)).
2For instance, Suzumura (1991) extends their model to n-ﬁrms, Kamien and Zang
(1993) evaluate the social desiderability of a single RJV as a form of industry coordina-
tion, Poyago-Theotoky (1995) studies the endogenous number of participants in the RJV
2of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, Kamien el al. (1990) deﬁne and compare
two diﬀerent types of RJVs, cartelised and competing RJVs. In both cases,
the degree of spillovers is perfect, laying the diﬀerence between them in the
setting of the R&D investments (non-cooperative in the ﬁrst case and co-
operative in the second). Nevertheless, the degree of spillovers remains ex-
ogenous3. An especially interesting research line has aimed at introducing
endogenous spillovers, therefore permitting ﬁrms to decide on the amount
of knowledge that ﬂows from one ﬁrm to another. Particularly, in Poyago-
Theotoky (1999), ﬁrms decide on the degree of information about their R&D
results to share, while in Kamien and Zang (2000) ﬁrms choose the speciﬁcity
of their R&D4. In both cases, it is shown that ﬁrms are interested in minimiz-
ing the spillovers which they produce when competing on R&D, while they
aim at maximizing them when they cooperate on R&D. Nonetheless, in these
works each ﬁrm can reduce the ﬂow of spillovers its own R&D originates in
a completely autonomous way by reducing to zero its share of information
or by choosing a totally ﬁrm-speciﬁc approach. However, when the design
and Petit and Tolwinski (1999) transform the original model to introduce dynamics and
asymmetries.
3The authors contemplate only perfect spillovers in the case of RJVs, without allowing
ﬁrms to decide about the degree of them.
4Another attempt to study endogeneous spillovers but in a diﬀerent framework can be
found Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998).
3of the R&D process requires the choice of a particular technology (for ex-
ample, choosing between a biotechnology or a more traditional technology)
spillovers can not be completely controlled by ﬁrms. Therefore, the existing
models fail to explain accurately ﬁrms’ behavior in situations in which they
have to choose their R&D technologies from a set of available technologies as
well as the arising of certain types of cooperative agreements such as patent
pools.
In our paper, we introduce an alternative way of modeling spillovers, fo-
cusing on the design of the R&D process. Our idea is the following: Each
ﬁrm can choose a type of technology among a continuum of technologies in
order to undertake its R&D process. The more compatible (the closer) the
chosen technologies are, the higher the spillovers. All available technologies
are ex-ante equally eﬃcient5.T h e r e f o r e , d i ﬀerently to the existing litera-
ture, in our model the spillovers depend on the compatibility between ﬁrms’
technologies.
Our main conclusions are the following: Firms are interested in using
very similar or identical R&D technologies in all the cases. Then, in order to
achieve this goal, some mean of coordination is needed, like the formation of
5This assumption is made in order to focus on the strategic eﬀect of the R&D
(spillovers), letting the eﬃciency eﬀect aside.
4a RJV or the establishment of patent pools. As a general rule, RJVs choose
identical technologies for partners. Moreover, from the social point of view,
a RJV implies higher levels of social welfare, contrary to other mechanisms
of coordination.
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we describe some em-
pirical observations not fully explained by current models. In section 3 we
describe our model. In section 4 we solve the non-cooperative case and in
section 5 and 6 the cases of patent pools and the RJVs respectively. In sec-
tion 7 we study the socially optimal choice of technologies and compare social
in the cooperative and in the non-cooperative cases. We brieﬂys u m m a r i z e
the main conclusions in section 8.
2 Empirical observations
A good example to motivate our point is the use of biotechnology as an
alternative to traditional technologies. Biotechnology has a number of appli-
cations in many diﬀerent industries, like chemistry, plastics, paper, textiles,
food or agriculture (Biotechnology Industry Organization (2003)). It is used
not only to produce new commodities, but also to improve the eﬃciency of
5manufacturing processes, due to the use of less energy and less inputs6.A l l
in all, a ﬁrm can decide to employ its R&D in order to prepare its systems
to use biotechnology or to improve some steps of its traditional manufactur-
ing process. As a consequence, spillovers appear only if ﬁrms’ R&D proﬁles
are similar. Moreover, even among ﬁrm using biotechnology, the degree of
spillovers will depend on the similarity between the chosen technologies used7.
Another interesting issue is the arising of patent pools. Firms involved
in such agreements license among them or to third parties complementary
knowledge that is substantial to a particular technology, facilitating this way
further research8. These type of cooperation has been followed carefully by
antitrust authorities (see for instance U.S. Department of Justice and Fed-
eral Trade Commission (1995)). Moreover, there is an evidently increasing
interest in understanding and assessing the eﬀect of these agreements in
biotechnology-related industries (see Clark et al. (2001) or OECD (2002)).
6For instance, while reactions using biological molecules require conditions compat-
ible with life, therefore needing less energy than chemical reactions. Other beneﬁts of
biotechnologies are the generation less waste and byproducts.
7For instance, with respect to cell culture, three types of technologies are available in
order to produce therapeutic proteins: plant cell culture, insect cell culture and mam-
malian cell culture. Another example appears in drug development, food processing or
industrial manufacturing, where recombinant DNA technology can be used in conjunction
with either molecular cloning or protein engineering.
8The ﬁrst examples of this collaborations can be found in the 20s in the industries of
sewing machines aircraft and radio manufacturing. More recently, in the late 90s, patent
pools have been created around the DVD and MPEG2 technologies.
6Patent pools seem to be a way of spreading basic R&D ﬁndings and enhance
new research aimed at developing commercial applications. Therefore, these
agreements allow ﬁrms to develop complementary R&D processes without
investing in a cooperative way (i.e. setting projects together)9.H o w e v e rt h i s
possibility should be ruled out by ﬁrms according to the existing theories,
which predict the minimization of spillovers when ﬁrms are not investing
cooperatively.
3T h e m o d e l
We consider an industry with two ﬁrms facing a linear inverse demand func-
tion:
P = a − Q (1)
where Q = q1 + q2 is the total quantity produced and a>Q≥ 0.
The total costs of production of each ﬁrm depend on their initial marginal
costs, A,a n dt h ee ﬀective level of R&D, Xi.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,e a c hﬁrm’s total
9This is similar to the RJV competition case in Kamien et al. (1993), although in their
case the degree of spillovers is exogenous. We consider that in a patent pool ﬁrms can
endogenously determine their degree.
7costs of production are given by:
Ci(qi,X i)=[ A − Xi]qi i ∈ {1,2} (2)
where Xi depends not only on the own investment, xi, but also on the other
ﬁrm’s investment, xj, via spillovers:
Xi = xi − βxj {i,j} ∈ {1,2} (3)
β, the degree of spillovers is a function of the distance between the two ﬁrms’
R&D technologies (Li,L j) rather than a ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameter. Then, β
can be written as follows:
β(d)=( 1− d)S (4)
where d is the “distance” between the two technologies, d = |Li − Lj|. Li,
Lj can be chosen from a continuum of technologies ranging from 0 to 1, that
is Li,L j ∈ [0...1]. On the other hand, S is the parameter that measures the
spillover potential, which depends on exogenous aspects and ranges between
80a n d1 10. Therefore, the closer ﬁrms’ R&D technologies are (the smaller d
is), the more ﬁrms can beneﬁt from the spillovers. Hence, β(d) ranges from 0
(when ﬁrms use the technologies which are as diﬀerent as possible from each
other) and S (when both ﬁrms use the same technology).
In order to ensure that marginal costs are positive, we must assume that
A>x i +βxj.B e s i d e s , e a c h ﬁrm’s R&D costs are assumed to be quadratic,
a sd e s c r i b e di n( 5 ) .γ determines the proﬁtability of the R&D (the higher γ






i i = {1,2} γ > 0( 5 )
All in all, i’s proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s :





i {i,j} ∈ {1,2} (6)
Firms choose in the ﬁrst stage the R&D technologies (Li, Lj). In the
second stage they decide on R&D investment (xi, xj). Finally, in the third
stage, they decide on quantities (qi, qj). As usual, we solve this game by
backward induction.
10In the following discussion we ommit the extreme case of S = 0, since it is trivial.
9Since there is no collusion in any of the contemplated cases, the solution




(a − A)+( 2− β)xi +( 2 β − 1)xj
3
, {i,j} ∈ {1,2} (7)
The reader should keep in mind that here β is a function, not a parameter.
Hereinafter we use the subindexes n, pp and rjv for the fully non-cooperative
case, the patent pool and the RJV respectively.
4 Competition in all stages





2(a − A)(2 − β)
9γ − 2(2 − β)(β +1 )
i ∈ {1,2} (8)
Using x∗
n,i as a solution to the second stage, the individual proﬁtf u n c t i o n
can be written as follows:
πn = πn,i =
γ(a − A)2(9bγ − 2(2 − β)2)
(9γ − 2(2 − β)(β +1 ) )
2 i ∈ {1,2} (9)
11It is easy to verify that the SOC is fulﬁlled.
12Second order conditions (SOC hereinafter) are fulﬁlled for any value of β if γ > 8/9.
10The study of
∂πn,i
∂d is suﬃcient for characterizing the diﬀerent equi-
libria in the technology choice stage. In fact, ﬁrms choose Li, Lj aiming at













4γ(a − A)2[27γ(1 − β) − 2(2 − β)3]







∂d is a constant,
∂πn,i
∂β is enough to determine the sign of
∂πn,i
∂d .T h u s ,
we implicitly ﬁnd the optimal degree of spillovers, δn.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e t h e
denominator in
∂πn,i
∂β is positive (to have positive outputs) and −4γ(a − A)2
is a constant, we can state that
∂πn,i
∂β =0w h e n[ 2 7 γ(1−β)−2(2−β)3]=0 .
δn is obtained by solving this equation and is plotted in ﬁgure 113.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 near here]
13SOC are fulﬁlled.
11It is interesting to note that the optimal degree of spillovers ranges from
0.9 to 1 and is increasing in γ. Firms choose their technologies in order to
obtain a degree of spillovers which is as c l o s ea sp o s s i b l et ot h eo p t i m a lo n e .
Nevertheless, ﬁrms face the constraint of the potential spillovers, S.T h i s
implies that provided that the spillover potential is greater than the optimal
one, ﬁrms are interested in keeping a distance between their technologies that
reduces the degree of spillovers to the optimal one. On the contrary, if the
spillover potential is below the optimal level, they rather choose the same
technology to have a degree of spillovers that is as close as possible to the
optimal one. This constitutes our ﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 1 In the non-cooperative case, ﬁrms choose Li, Lj so that dn
is:
i) 0,∀ S ≤ δn
ii) S−δn
S ,∀S>δn
The achievement of the goals remarked in proposition 1 bears an obvious
diﬃculty for non-cooperating ﬁrms, given the available set of technologies
and the simultaneity of choices. As a consequence, ﬁrms are interested in
seeking a way of coordinating their choices in order to obtain higher proﬁts.
One of such mechanisms is the formation of patent pools, allowing ﬁrms
12to conduct parallel complementary research afterwards. This would mean
coordination in the ﬁrst stage (R&D technology) but not in the second (R&D
level of investment) Another mechanism of coordination is the formation
of RJVs, which implies coordination in the ﬁrst and in the second stage.
In the following sections we analyze these two mechanisms of coordination.
Moreover, in section 7 we give some insights into the welfare implications of
patent pools.
Remark: Patent pools and RJVs constitute mechanisms of coordination
for ﬁrms’ R&D technology decisions.
5 The Patent Pool
I nt h ec a s eo fp a t e n tp o o l s ,ﬁrms choose cooperatively their R&D technolo-
gies (cooperation in the ﬁrst stage) but non-cooperatively their level of in-
vestments (competition in the second stage). This means that the solution
to the second stage is given by (7) and thus, cooperative proﬁts in the ﬁrst




πn,i =2 πn (11)
13It is straightforward to see that the solution to the ﬁrst stage in the case of
a patent pool is the same that in the non-cooperative case (i.e. the distance
between technologies that allow ﬁrms to achieve a degree of spillovers as
close as possible to the optimal ones, δn). In this case, as pointed out before,
the solution to the ﬁrst stage is immediately reached by ﬁr m sa so p p o s e dt o
the non-cooperative case, in which ﬁrms face a coordination problem in the
technology choice subgame.
6 The Research Joint Venture
A RJV decides cooperatively on R&D technology and on R&D investment
(cooperation in the ﬁrst and second stages). Cooperative proﬁts can be





















2(a − A)(β +1 )
9γ − 2(β +1 ) 2 i ∈ {1,2} (13)
14SOC holds for any value of β when γ > 10
9 .
14Inserting x∗
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It is obvious that
∂πrjv
∂d is always negative. As a consequence, the solution to
this stage implies that d = |Li − Lj| =0 . The following proposition summa-
rizes our main ﬁndings in these sections:
Proposition 2 The RJV chooses identical technologies for the two ﬁrms
while a patent pool ﬁrms choose Li, Lj so that d is:
i) 0,∀ S ≤ δn
ii) S−δn
S ,∀S>δn
157S o c i a l W e l f a r e
In this section we analyze social welfare. Social welfare (SW), that is the
sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS), is calculated
by introducing the solutions to the output and R&D investments stages in
equilibrium as functions of the distance between technologies. In table 1,
the reader can ﬁnd the values of CS, PS and SW for both the case with
cooperative investment (RJVs) and non-cooperative investment (competition
in all the stages and patent pools)15.W eu s et h es u b i n d e xnci to refer to the
regimes with non-cooperative investments.
















Table 1: Values for CS, PS and SW.
15Given that we are interested in deriving the socially optimal distance between tech-
nologies, we need to express SW as a function of d. It is obvious that this expression
is the same in the fully non-cooperative case than in the patent pool case (since the two
regimes provide the same level of investment). Therefore we represent both regimes under
the same label (”non-cooperative investment”).
16The socially optimal distance between ﬁrms’ technologies (do)i st h ed i s -
tance that maximizes social welfare. In the case of non-cooperative invest-
ment (competition in all the stages and patent pools), the derivative of the













8(a − c)2γ[9γ(4 + 5β) − 2(2 − β)3]




As before, the study of
∂SWnci
∂β is enough to characterize do
nci. This distance
will be the one that facilitates the degree of spillovers which is the closest to
the socially optimal ones, δ
o
nci. It is easy to see that
∂SWnci
∂β = 0 if [9γ(4 +
5β)−2(2−β)3]=0 .δ
o
nci is determined by solving this equation16 and plotted
in ﬁgure 217.
[Insert ﬁgure 2 near here]
16Whenever x∗
nci,i is positive, the denominator in ∂SWnci
∂β is positive too.
17SOC are fulﬁlled.
17Therefore, there is an interior solution for do
nci for each of the combinations
of γ and S:I fS>δ
o
nci, do
nci is a value such that β = δ
o





On the other hand, if S ≤ δ
o
nci ,t h e ndo
nci =0 .














4(a − A)2γ(β +1 ) [ 2 7 bγ − 2(β +1 ) 2]




Given that the denominator and the numerator in
∂SWrjv
∂β are positive18,t h e
socially optimal degree of spillovers, δ
o
rjv, is equal to 1. As a consequence,
do
rjv =0 .
Furthermore, it is interesting to study which of the cases (non-cooperative
or cooperative) is superior from the social welfare point of view. We ﬁnd that
a RJV leads to higher social welfare levels than the case of non-cooperative
18The denominator is positive provided that x∗
rjv,i is positive.
18investments. That is, for each γ, SWrjv is always higher than SWnci.T h e
proof follows: The maximum value of SWnci is achieved with β = δ
o
nci,w h i c h
implies values for S between δ
o
nci and 1. On the other hand, within this
range of S (S ∈ [δ
o
nci,1]), the minimum value of SWrjv will be achieved with
S = δ
o
rjv, since in equilibrium in the cooperative case d =0a n dSWrjv
is increasing across the spillovers. It can be seen from table 219 that the
maximum value of SWnci is always below the minimum of SWrjv for any












Table 2: Minimum SWrjv and maximum SWnci.
19Note that SW is the product of the values in the table times 4(a − A)2γ.
19Finally, it is interesting to remark that patent pools can damage social
welfare when the spillover potential, S, is very high. For instance, when
γi =1 .25, if S =1 ,do
nci is 0.273420, although ﬁrms in a patent pool would
choose d =0 .0732642. Then if ﬁrms coordinate their choices of technologies
but not their level of investment, as in the case of patent pools, the result
might be socially worse than in the uncoordinated case. Thus, policy-makers
must consider this potential damage when they analyze cooperative R&D.
Remark: When there is high potential spillover potential, coordination
between ﬁrms in the choice of technologies can reduce social welfare if it is
not accompanied by coordination in investment levels.
Finally, the results of this section are reported in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3 The socially optimal distance between technologies is:
For the case of non-cooperative investments (competition in all the stages
and patent pools): do
n =









For the case of the RJV : do
rjv =0 .
20For all the values of γ, social welfare is always with RJVs than in the
case of non-cooperative investments.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have introduced a novel way of modeling R&D spillovers, the
emissions of which depend on the choices on R&D technologies made by all
ﬁrms in the market. The more similar the technologies are, the higher the de-
gree of spillovers. This situation takes place when a ﬁrm can choose between
diﬀerent alternatives (for instance, choosing between traditional technolo-
gies or new technologies). We ﬁnd that even in the fully non-cooperative
case ﬁrms are interested in using very similar R&D technologies in order to
obtain a very high degree of spillovers. Considering the evident diﬃculty
in achieving these goals, several mechanisms of coordination can arise, like
the formation of patent pools or RJVs. Furthermore, a RJV uses the same
technology in both ﬁrms.
With reference to social welfare, the socially optimal distance between
technologies is generally zero. Exceptions to this rule appear when ﬁrms are
not cooperating on investments and spillover potential is very high. In those
21cases, it is socially better that ﬁrms use very similar technologies rather than
identical ones. Moreover, social welfare is higher in the case of a RJV than
in the cases of non-cooperative investments.
All these facts illustrate an alternative motivation for the formation of
p a t e n tp o o l sa n dR J V s ,a saw a yo fc o o r d i n a t i n gt h ed e c i s i o n so fﬁrms con-
cerning their R&D proﬁles. Furthermore, the RJV implements the solutions
that provide the highest levels of social welfare. Alternative ways of coordi-
nation, such as patent pools, which do not imply coordination in the levels of
investment might damage social welfare when the spillover potential is very
high.
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Figure 1: Optimal degree of spillovers. Competition in all the stages. 
 
 






















Figure 2: Socially optimal degree of spillovers. Non-cooperative investments. 











nci δ  